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INTRODUCTION
What does theory mean for design
practitioners?
In January 2007, The Danish School of Design
got the headlines in the Danish newspaper
Weekendavisen. The news reported concerns a
conflict of power: who is to define what kind
of theory that is needed in the design fields?
This question has been heavily discussed for
two decades. Still, no consensus is reached. In
order to please political authorities who
demand research outcomes in higher
educational institutions, The Danish School of
Design have employed researchers from
academic fields, while teachers of practical
subjects are pushed aside. However, research
results with little relevance for the
professional practices that they ought to serve,
have nurtured the criticism of theory skeptics:
research and theory building make students
able to cite famous theoreticians but useless as
professional designers.1
1 “Den grundlæggende konflikt var, hvem der skulle
forske i designteori. Skulle man satse på at
videreuddanne folk inden for faget, eller skulle man
hente akademikere udefra? […] Faren ved at kaste vrag
på de håndværksmæssige færdigheder er jo, at det går
ligesom hos sygeplejerskerne: Man kan citere
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This paper aims at contributing to solve this
unhappy antagonism between theory and
practice. According to the Norwegian
philosopher Olav Eikeland, who works on
Aristotle (384-322 BC), a closer reading of his
texts may contribute to heal the split between
academic and practical working traditions. By
taking point of departure in the Greek origins
of the terms theory and knowledge, the paper
outlines a simple model that allows for a
development of two basically different types
of knowledge and thereby theory within
design: 1) personal theory and 2) theory in the
academic sense of the term. Personal theory is
the theory that practitioners acquire through
their work experience and which is proven in
practice. It may be regarded a sub theory.
Theory in its established form aspires at
generalized explanations and understanding
that goes beyond personal practice.
The paper outlines various aspects of the
concepts theory and knowledge related to
practice. In conclusion a simple model offers a

Habermas, men man aner ikke, hvordan man lægger en
forbinding” (Weekendavisen 2007: 2).

visual representation of the general theory
components within design.
THEORY: Theôría and Theôrêsis
Today’s term theory has a double Greek root:
theôría and theôrêsis. Theôría means insight
and the ability to act right and efficiently in
practice, while theôrêsis means viewing
something from a distance. According to
Eikeland, this dual root of theory ought to
have given rise to two separate traditions of
knowledge and theory building.
Although both categories of theory aims at
knowledge, understanding and insight it is a
great distinction between practical professions
of making something like clocks on the one
hand, and speculative hypotheses concerning
astronomy on the other. Theôría is to be
understood as a theory of practice for the
practitioner. It may apply as functionalities
and rules in making professions, grammar
concerning languages, and methodology or
logic in scientific contexts (Eikeland 2006: 1314). According to Eikeland, the projected
theory, theôrêsis, watching something from a
distance and taking a bird’s perspective, has
been given an exclusive hegemony as true
knowledge (scientific), while theôría
connected to producing practical work fell
during history out of the theoretical
knowledge categories all together (Eikeland
2006: 16; Gustavsson 2000: 44).
KNOWLEDGE: Epistêmê and Tèkhnê
Aristotle distinguishes between three principal
categories of knowledge: epistêmê as true
knowledge, tèkhnê as technical craft based
competence, and phrónêsis as the practical
wisdom. Only the two first categories will be
discussed further.
Today, epistêmê is most often translated as
scientific knowledge. Eikeland, however,
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holds that epistêmê in its original meaning
should be translated as understanding rather
than knowledge. In Theaetetus (written 360
BC) by Plato (427-347 BC), Socrates asks
Theaetetus: what is knowledge; can we answer
that question; are wisdom and knowledge the
same; and are perception and knowledge the
same? After a long dialogue he concludes that:
“What seems to a man, is to him” (Plato 2007:
28). From this saying, knowledge is taken to
be true, justifiable belief. This is the basis of
the scientific understanding of knowledge in
the Western tradition, and the teaching of
knowledge is called epistemology from Greek
episteme (Gustavsson 2000: 30).
Another kind of knowledge is the one
underlying the ability to produce something,
Aristotle denotes it tèkhnê. When these two
knowledge concepts of epistêmê and tèkhnê
were brought into the philosophical discussion
more than 2400 years ago, the distinctions
between academic and practical work as we
know them in our time, did not exist. The two
represented different ways of knowing that
were useful for separate needs. Aristotle
speaks of a reasoned capacity to make:
… art [Aristotle here speaks of
architecture] is identical with a state of
capacity to make, involving a true
course of reasoning. All art is
concerned with coming into being, i. e.
with contriving and considering how
something may come into being which
is capable of either being or not being,
and whose origin is in the maker and
not in the thing made (Aristotle 350
BC: section 4).
In consequence, experience (Greek empeiría)
from any proficiency may be developed to
become knowledge either in the form of
epistêmê or tèkhnê, dependent on what they
concern. This implies that any issue, whether
theoretical or practical in today’s terminology,
if analyzed and described down to its

elementary aspects and set in context,
represent knowledge. Accumulated experience
from practical work take basically two forms:
the ability to perform or skill, and
understanding, often called knowledge of
confidence (Refsum 2002). The basis for
epistêmê and tèkhnê is the ability to separate
between things and acts. The one that could do
this and mastered his field was an able master
of knowledge; if the topic was theoretical the
person was an epistêmôn, if it was practical, a
tekhnítês (Eikeland 2006: 11-14). Both Plato
and Aristotle think of tèkhnê as knowledge
included in epistêmê, i. e. as a special type of
true knowledge. You have knowledge when
you are able to distinguish right from wrong
and to explain what you do and why.
Knowledge simply means to have insight in
something (Gustavsson 2000: 41). However,
Aristotle makes a distinction between two
types of practical work, the ability to produce
and make something new (Greek poiésis) and
that of just doing anything (Greek praxis).
This distinction came to disappear during the
recent centuries and thereby, practice lost its
legitimate place within theoretical thinking
(Gustavsson 2000: 44).
THREE KNOWLEDGE CATEGORIES:
CRAFTS, DESIGN AND MATHEMATICS
In the Greek Antiquity we find true knowledge
expressed in two ways, one for producing
practicalities, tèkhnê, that implies both the
ability to plan and to execute, the other for
speculative theorizing, epistêmê. In the Middle
Ages these three categories of knowledge can
be distinguished in the field of building: the
knowledge of the crafts persons, the
knowledge of the designers, and the
knowledge of the mathematicians. When the
cathedral of Milan was to be erected in 1390, a
disagreement concerning the height of the
building arose between the crafts persons and
the responsible architect. In order to solve the
problem crafts men, architects and
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mathematicians came together to discuss the
matter (Jensenius 2006: 85). In this meeting
representatives of three categories of
knowledge came together: practitioners who
had primary experience and knowledge of
materials and building processes, planners
who had practical experience, but had moved
on to specialize in planning, and theoreticians
without building experience, who worked
theoretically on mathematics that might have
relevance to the applied mathematics in
buildings.
TACIT KNOWLEDGE
The fact that practitioners have left almost no
written testimony on their trade through
history, has led to the notion that practical
knowledge is tacit and secret. However, the
event in Milan is one exception to the rule. It
may be taken to indicate that written sources
on practical work lacks simply because they
were not necessary to keep professional
practices going. The Bristish philosopher
Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) in 1949 spoke up for
a new understanding of practice versus theory,
of intelligent versus intellectual. According to
Ryle, it is a misunderstanding to think that
practitioners have a clear understanding of the
sequences they are to carry out. He says:
“Efficient practice precedes the theory of it
[…] ‘Intelligent’ cannot be defined in terms of
‘intellectual’ or ‘knowing how’ in terms of
‘knowing that’” (Ryle 2002: 30 and 32).
The Hungarian British scientist Michael
Polanyi (1891-1976) built upon Ryle and
introduced the term tacit knowledge to explain
phenomena within the fields of science and
everyday experiences of perception. Polanyi
addressed contemporary understanding of
knowledge. He writes: “I shall reconsider
human knowledge by starting from the fact
that we can know more than we can tell”
(Polanyi 1983: 4). He explains how the basic
structure in tacit knowing involves two things

at the same time, one that we draw attention
to, and another that we disattend. One example
is when we make something, then we
disattend what our muscles do to focus on the
performance (Polanyi 1983: 10). Our true
knowledge lies in our ability to use it whether
it is language, mathematics or crafting. “This
is why mathematical theory can be learned
only by practicing its application: its true
knowledge lies in our ability to use it (Polanyi
1983: 17). Polanyi intended to explain a
general phenomenon he had observed in
everyday experiences of perception and his
own work within several fields of science. The
Swedish philosopher Bertil Rolf sums up the
idea of Polanyi saying: ”All our knowledge
rests on a tacit dimension”2 (Rolf 1991: 13).
Although Polanyi did not speak of practical
producing work in particular, it is in these
fields that his ideas of tacit knowledge mostly
have been taken into use (Gustavsson 2000:
103).
EXPLICIT, TACIT AND INEFFABLE
KNOWLEDGE
Know-how is more differentiated than just to
be labeled tacit. Scandinavian interpreters of
Polanyi have in the 1980s suggested a model
of knowledge in which they distinguish three
categories: 1) theoretical or explicit
knowledge that can be verbally expressed
(knowing that), 2) practical knowledge or skill
that is learnt through practice (knowing how),
and 3) knowledge of confidence that implies
and overview and understanding but not
necessarily the skill of how to do, within a
field (Rolf 1991: 40; Gustavsson 2000: 112).
This model may be useful in understanding the
activities within making fields (Refsum 2002).
Applied on the Milan meeting, one may say
that as their principal knowledge the crafts
persons had skills of how to mason, the
architects had knowledge of confidence of
2

My translation from Swedish: ”All vår kunskap vilar
på en tyst dimension”.
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how to plan an erection of a building and the
mathematicians had explicit knowledge about
abstract mathematics. None of them were
experts in all categories.3 The British
Professor of Continuing Education Peter Jarvis
has suggested slightly different terms of the
same knowledge areas that perhaps may better
suit practitioners’ understanding. Jarvis
distinguishes between content knowledge or
knowledge why (knowing that), process
knowledge or knowledge how (knowledge of
confidence), and knowledge how to do (skill)
(Jarvis 1999: 16).
When the late British journalist on craft and
design Peter Dormer (-1996) bluntly stated:
“Craft relies on tacit knowledge” (Dormer:
1997: 147), he clearly spoke of skills.
According to Dormer: “Tacit knowledge is
practical know-how, and it exists in people.
Consequently tacit knowledge is learned and
absorbed by individuals through practice and
from other people; it cannot usually be learnt
from books” (Dormer 1997: 147). However,
this kind of unarticulated knowledge is
something completely different from ideas we
carry with us almost unconsciously of being
human, gendered, incultured in a nation,
religion etc. The British philosopher and
graphic designer Michael Biggs criticizes the
way the concept of tacit knowledge has been
taken into use by practical fields. He
underscores that the so called tacit knowledge
may or may not be tacit dependent on need. If
we bother, much of what may seem to be tacit,
in the sense that it is not talked about, can be
expressed in words, pointed out or
demonstrated. Still, there exists really tacit
knowledge called ineffable knowledge that
stems from experiential feeling, which cannot
be put to words or shown even if we tried to
(Biggs 2004: 12).
PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE

3

The term expert is used in accordance with Dreyfus
and Dreyfus ideas (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2000: 30).

Instead of speaking of tacit knowledge
concerning practical work, making and craft,
practical knowledge as understood from its
root in tèkhnê, can be more useful. Jarvis
defines:
Practical knowledge is the
practitioner’s own knowledge that has
been legitimated in practice. It is
personal and qualitative. Its
legitimation is that it works for me,
and because it does, I develop my own
ways of doing things in accordance
with my own values, beliefs and
feelings (Jarvis 1999: 46).
According to Jarvis practical knowledge is a
combination of several types of knowledge:
process knowledge of making (how as
confidence, and how to do), content
knowledge (making what) and relevant
knowledge from academic fields. Jarvis
underscores that practical knowledge is
practical and not academic or theoretic; it is
related to practice situations and integrated in
the maker. It is a knowledge that is proven
because it works and it has tacit elements that
cannot be explained verbally or shown (Jarvis
1999: 44-48).
Taken together we then have four categories
of knowledge related to practice that can be
distinguished: 1) explicit or content
knowledge that can be localized and
expressed; 2) process knowledge that includes
knowledge of confidence and skill, both
consisting of components that can be
demonstrated and made explicit, while some
parts remain implicit and tacit; 3) tacit
knowledge that is unarticulated; and 4)
ineffable knowledge of values and beliefs that
under no circumstances can be expressed in
words or adequately symbolized, figure 1.
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Figure 1 The nature of practical knowledge, after
Jarvis (Jarvis 1999: 49).

REFLECTION IN ACTION
In the late 1970s, the US social scientist and
consultant Donald Schön sought an alternative
to the academic knowledge tradition and
started to investigate professional knowledge.
He observed among others the interplay
between a teacher, Quist, and a student, Petra,
in an architect school. Schön registered how
the two communicated through sketching, key
words and demonstration. The teacher
accompanied his student to a solution of her
design problem. Their communication, which
led to the solving of the problem, Schön
defined as reflection in action (Schön 1995:
54). Although teacher and student hardly
talked together, the communication between
them was successful. Schön writes: ”His
[Quist’s] talk is full of dychtic utterances –
’here’, ’this’, ’that’ – which Petra can interpret
only by observing his movements” (Schön
1983: 81). This communication was not tacit,
nor verbal, but based on visuality and body
movements. It was a rational discourse
executed through drawing and gestures (Schön
1995: 82-87). This example shows how the
knowledge types of confidence and skill that
by many would be categorized as tacit, are
expressed and communicated; they are neither
tacit, nor ineffable.

RETROSPECTIVE REFLECTION
Practitioners reflect in action, but they also
reflect before and after they act. Studies show
that retrospective reflection is essential in
learning. Especially when we learn something
new, we are analytical in our approach. We
cleverly think about what we are going to do,
concentrate while trying to do it, and reflect
through the process afterwards in order to
secure that we did the right thing or become
aware of what actually happened. When we
master for instance to swim, drive a car or
execute our practices, and do it professionally,
we act merely automatically or intuitively
(Dreyfus and Dreyfus 2000: 50). However,
when something goes wrong, even the expert
will start pondering on the sequence of events
in order to explain the failure. If a reasonable
explanation is found, the failure may be
explained. This understanding gained can be
integrated individually or within a field as a
new knowledge that may help us perform
better and avoid similar incidents in the future
(Petroski 1992). At all stages of
professionalism practitioners may benefit and
learn from evaluating their performance.
Through retrospective reflection practitioners
become aware of their actions and acquire
more practical knowledge in the form of
knowledge of confidence, which is their own.
The result of this kind of reflection will help
them plan and predict for future events (Jarvis
1999: 70).
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE Accumulation
of the knowledge that arises from
retrospective reflection on personal experience
adds to the individual’s personal knowledge
base from which one later can draw. It is the
totality of our practical knowledge stored that
helps us act in new practice situation. Even if
this kind of knowledge is called personal it is
culturally embedded and thereby shared and
recognizable by others. Rolf says: “Personal
knowledge is a unity of tradition and
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subjectivity in one person” (Rolf 1991: 96)4.
This means that personal knowledge goes
beyond the merely subjective. It consists of
personal practical experience that is related to
the tradition of the field in question, which is
commonly shared. Concerning skills one may
say that skill is tradition perceived by the
individual. Skill is acquired by reflective
practice, which is embedded in tradition. You
cannot become a good practitioner on your
own; you learn it from somebody, but you
have to master it on your own.
PERSONAL THEORY OF PRACTICE
AND PERSONAL THEORY
When practitioners reflect on their personal
practical knowledge they acquire an overview
of their practical work, which is a theoretical
understanding of their work, i. e. a personal
theory of practice. To this theoretical
understanding based on learning from
practical experience, they add all kinds of
knowledge and information from other sources
that they have accumulated in their lives,
including academic theory. Taken together,
this abstract thinking constitutes their personal
theory. A personal theory is individual,
personal and subjective. It arises from within
the practitioner’s experience and is pragmatic
and dynamic directed to previous and future
practice situations. But as with the personal
knowledge, the personal theory concerning a
field of competence is constituted by its shared
education, rules, attitudes, information
sources, and social and personal relationships.
One practitioner’s personal theory cannot be
entirely different from that of other
practitioners’ in the same field. What is
subjective in the personal theories will be the
conglomerate of knowledge that is
accumulated and how this knowledge is used
and accented according to the individual
4

Swedish: ”Personlig kunskap är
en förening av tradition och subjektivitet innom en
person”, my translations.

practitioner’s interests and aims. Personal
theory is not the same as theory of or about
practice that is general and informative. Jarvis
defines: “Personal theory consists of fully
integrated knowledge that combines learning
from doing and thinking about practice with
learning from other information sources”
(Jarvis 1999: 145), figure 2.

Figure 2 The relationship between practice and
personal theory, after Jarvis (Jarvis 1999: 134).

From the model is seen that a personal theory
grows through a sequence that can be modeled
in four principal steps. It starts in 1) the work
situation in practice; continues with 2)
retrospective reflection; goes on with 3)
adding information from sources outside the
practical situation, and ends 4) by integrating
the new understanding gained, which then
becomes new knowledge that adds to the
personal theory and can be tested in new
practice situations. Then the loop revolves
again.
RESEARCH
According to the model presented,
practitioners may acquire new knowledge in
two different ways: 1) by retrospective
reflection on personal practice and 2) by
information from external sources. When new
information is actively sought, practitioners
have to look for it outside their personal
practice. This is a task of theôresis, of
-7-

overlooking and finding relevant information
outside the personal practice. Such an activity
implies an inquiry. An inquiry can be shallow
or deep, done at random or systematically. The
systematic inquiry may grow to become a
research project. One reason why practitioners
start doing research work is expressed in the
book The Craft of Research saying: “Most
everyday research begins not with finding a
topic but with confronting a problem that has
typically found you, a problem that left
unresolved means trouble” (Booth, Colomb
and Williams 1995: 49).
Many design tasks are complex and difficult,
or even impossible, to solve adequately
without extensive information gathering.
Sometimes, the information gathering process
does not lead to the expected outcome. If
designers need an answer to a particular
problem in order to continue to design, they
may have to find out for themselves. Booth
and Colomb’s model shows how a practical
problem motivates the research question that
defines the research problem, which finds the
research answer that helps solve the initial
problem. Then the design process may be
carried out successfully, figure 3.

Figure 3 Practical problems generate research
problems (after Booth, Colomb and Williams 1995: 49).

However, research may for design
practitioners represent a detour from their
design work. It certainly takes something to
get research training, competences and skills,
and to work out the research. The aim of
research is to contribute to create new original
knowledge that is shared within a community
(Friedman 2003: 509).
ALTERNATIVE DESIGN APPROACHES
Designers may apply several approaches
to their design tasks and work differently,
figure 4.

model. This approach has an explicit
continuous-educational-attitude built into the
design process. The line in the model is drawn
shorter than in the first approach since the
studying attitude by necessity takes time. In
the third variety a new curl called R, standing
for research, is included. The line is
substantially shortened because research takes
time away from the practical design process.
However, this approach may constitute a
research based design process adequate for
certain complex tasks that cannot be solved
without research. As such it is as efficient as it
could be. In addition, a research based design
process generates research outcomes in
addition to the design result. Finally, some
designers become so engaged in research that
they continue to do research and leave their
design practice. They still operate within the
design field and have an understanding of
practice.
DESIGNER’S THEORY DEVELOPMENT
If the relationship between practice and
personal theory as modeled by Jarvis in figure
2 is combined with the alternative design
approaches as shown in figure 4, a new model
may be constructed, figure 5.

Figure 4 Alternative design approaches
The most common, professional way of
working as a designer is to further the tradition
into which one was trained. The professional
practice is developed in collaboration with
colleagues through work, social events,
published material, including research
outcomes, and the field’s associations.
Another way of working includes a more
active information gathering and study than
the first, indicated by the curl called s in the
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Figure 5 Designers’ theory development
In this model the area of the big curl
represents theôría, personal insight, while the

field outside the curl is seen as theôresis, all
kinds of theory and understanding. Moving
from practice situation 1, the inwardly directed
curl, called rr, that stands for retrospective
reflection. This curl may be small, big or non
existent. The same applies to the next
outwardly directed curl, called s, that
represents study. It is drawn outside the field
of personal insight to indicate that information
is found in the external field. Thereafter,
comes the bigger outwardly directed curl,
labeled R, for research. It is bigger to indicate
that this task is more demanding than the
study. The R curl is connected to practice and
the insight area, but is enclosed in the
theôresis field. The arrow pointing outwardly
indicates a theory outcome that adds to the
external, theôresis field.
The efforts of the various curls become
integrated in the compartment of personal
theory, which is one of continuous expansion.
It consists of two parts, placed on both sides of
the line of the personal insight area. The line
indicates that the personal theory consists of
two kinds of knowledge: 1) theôría, practical
insight and abilities and 2) theôresis, explicit
knowledge. From the personal theory area is
drawn an outwardly arrow, which indicates
that some of the personal theory can be
communicated into the theôresis field. It adds
in its tèkhnê form to epistêmê, the general
knowledge and theory that exist.
CONCLUSION
What does theory mean for design
practitioners?
It means:
1) personal insight (theôría), as the
awareness of personal actions and
reflections in practice
2) general information (theôresis) that is
gained through research
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3) personal theory that combines insight
(theôría) and general information
(theôresis).
In a well developed form the personal theory
is the guaranty of tèkhnê, the professional
understanding of a subject, which is partly
personal and partly embedded in the broader
and general concept of knowledge that is
epistêmê.
All practitioners have their personal theory of
practice. The personal theory consists of both
articulated and non articulated knowledge in
various degrees, the first to be discussed, the
other to be demonstrated in the work. It
remains open to what degree practitioners
want to extend their personal theory, in what
way – more retrospective reflection, more
information seeking and studying, or more
research – and at what times in their careers.
All the same it may be useful to have a visual
map (theôresis) in which designers’ work may
be understood. However, no part of the model
is the more valuable to the practitioner than
the bottom line: the practice.
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